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Even within narrowly defined manufacturing industries, firms 
display very different patterns of participation in international 
markets. While some firms do well serving only customers in their 
home country, others export into foreign markets, or set up a foreign 
subsidiary in order to produce abroad.  
Only recently has economic theory been able to produce an 
explanation for such differences between firms, in a paper by 
Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004). This new strand of theory traces 
back different patterns of internationalization to innate differences in 
productivity levels between firms, and predicts a productivity 
ordering of firms according to their degree of participation in 
international commerce: Low productivity firms are predicted to 
serve only the home market, while better performers can afford to 
expand their market towards foreign buyers through exporting. 
Finally, the highest productivity firms are predicted to serve foreign 
markets by establishing production plants abroad, and thus engage in 
foreign direct investment (FDI). It is this productivity ordering that 
we test in this paper, using firm-level data from the German 
manufacturing sector. 
For this purpose, we have been able to merge a representative 
firm-level data set from the Mannheim Innovation Panel, which is the 
German part of the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) of the 
European Commission, with complete records on foreign subsidiaries 
from the micro-data base MiDi (Micro Database Direct Investment) 
provided by the German Bundesbank.  
We group firms into three categories according to their 
participation in international commerce, and undertake productivity 
comparisons, using a testing technique that makes comparisons over 
the entire distribution of productivity in the three groups of firms 
rather than only comparing means. We show that German exporters 
outperform firms that serve only the domestic market. In a similar 
manner, German multinational firms, defined as firms with 
subsidiaries abroad, are more productive than both domestically 
focused and exporting firms in Germany. These findings hold true for 
each year from 1996 to 2002. Our results from German 
manufacturing firms are thus consistent with one of the key 
predictions from theory about the determinants of different trade 
orientations among firms within the same industry.   
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This paper tests some of the predictions of recent advances in trade theory 
that have focused on different trade patterns of firms within the same 
sector. Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2005) develop a model in which 
innate productivity differences between firms determine the degree of 
international engagement of firms: The least productive firms produce for 
the domestic market, better performers engage in export activities, and the 
top firms establish foreign subsidiaries. Using German firm-level data from 
1996 to 2002, we test this prediction using non-parametric methods, by 
examining the distribution functions of the three subsets of firms for 
stochastic dominance. Rather than just comparing first moments, this 
technique allows us to compare productivity over the entire distribution. 
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1 Introduction 
It is a well-established empirical fact that even within 
narrowly defined manufacturing industries, firms display considerable 
heterogeneity with regard to the extent to which they serve foreign 
markets. While some firms do well serving only their home market, 
others are able to generate additional gains in export markets, or find 
it profitable to set up a foreign subsidiary in order to produce for 
demand in foreign countries. Both the ‘traditional’ and ‘new’ trade 
theories rely on representative firms and are thus unable to explain 
how firms belonging to the same sector can display heterogeneous 
behavior. However, a recent strand of theory initiated by Melitz 
(2004) and Bernard et al. (2003) has been able to explain 
heterogeneity with respect to foreign trade in a formal framework. 
Firm heterogeneity is traced back to innate differences in 
productivity levels, which are modeled as draws from a common 
distribution function. Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) (henceforth 
HMY) extend the framework of Melitz (2004) to incorporate the 
possibility that firms engage in foreign direct investment (FDI). One 
of the key predictions of their model is a productivity ordering of 
firms according to their patterns of participation in international 
commerce.  
In the theoretical model, firms receive a random productivity 
draw from a given distribution. Subsequently, entrants self-select 
themselves into one of 3 categories depending on the outcome of their 
draw. Entrants may produce for the domestic market only, export or 
establish a foreign subsidiary. Increasing participation in 
international markets is a strictly monotonous function of a firm’s 
productivity: Low productivity firms serve only the home market, 
while better performers can afford to pay the additional fixed cost of 
expanding their market towards foreign buyers through exporting. 
Finally, the highest productivity draws will establish production 
plants in foreign markets, and thus engage in horizontal foreign 
direct investment (FDI).
1 It is this productivity ordering that we test 
in this paper, using firm-level data from the German manufacturing 
sector. 
                                                 
1 Licensing arrangements are not a predicted pattern of this model, and are not 
dealt with in this paper. An additional prediction of their model, which is not 
examined here either, is that FDI will be relatively more prominent in sectors with 
higher dispersion of firm productivities.     2   
While theoretically attractive, and thus far the only 
theoretical explanation of firm heterogeneity with respect to both 
trade and investment, the HMY model still lacks a solid empirical 
foundation. Most of the existing empirical evidence covers only parts 
of the heterogeneity explanations offered by HMY. For instance, it 
has been documented that exporting firms tend to outperform non-
exporters, and that subsidiaries of multinationals are more productive 
than domestic firms in the host country.  
The scarcity of comprehensive empirical evidence so far may 
be due to the fact that micro-data with records on export behavior 
and outward foreign investment on the same firms are not readily 
available for many countries. This paper makes use of a newly 
merged dataset on German  manufacturing firms to test the model 
predictions using the concept of stochastic dominance. Rather than 
comparing first moments alone, this concept tests for differences over 
the entire distribution of firm productivities. Intuitively, a 
distribution dominates another one if its cumulative distribution 
function lies entirely to the right of the other one. Stochastic 
dominance can be tested non-parametrically using one- and two-sided 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests (KS-tests). In our eyes, this empirical 
concept is close in spirit to the self-selection mechanism in the HMY 
model. We apply these tests to the distribution of total factor 
productivity (TFP) of German firms. Our TFP estimates are 
obtained using a semi-parametric estimation technique following 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). This estimator delivers consistent 
estimates even in the presence of a possible correlation of factor input 
choice and unobserved shocks to productivity.  
  Our results display a remarkable fit of the productivity 
distributions of German firms with the pattern predicted by the 
HMY model. Exporting firms clearly outperform non-exporting firms 
over the entire productivity distribution, and the same holds for 
German multinational firms vis-à-vis the former group. The empirical 
confirmation of the rank ordering of firms with different patterns of 
international commerce in terms of productivity  is a novel empirical 
result, and is consistent with the mechanisms at work in the HMY 
model.  
   3   
2 Theory 
The firm choice between exporting at arms’ length and foreign 
direct investment has traditionally been modeled as a proximity-
concentration trade-off (Brainard 1993, 1997). Increasing returns to 
scale at the plant level create incentives to concentrate production in 
one place, while transaction costs associated with distance between 
the locations of production and sale provide a countervailing force 
towards establishing a production plant closer to the foreign market. 
This trade-off has found support in data at the industry level, but it 
cannot explain heterogeneous choices of firms within sectors.  
  In the heterogeneous firms model by Helpman, Melitz and 
Yeaple (2004), firms within each sector display heterogeneous levels 
of productivity. Decisions are made according to the following 
sequence: Potential entrants pay a sunk cost fE in order to enter an 
industry. Upon paying this sunk cost, which has almost the 
interpretation of a lottery ticket, an entrant receives a random 
productivity draw in the form of a labor input coefficient a per unit 
of output from a known distribution G(a).
2 Having learned about its 
draw, a firm may decide to leave the market altogether (in which 
case it has profits π = - fE < 0  and will ex post regret having 
participated) or to pay an additional fixed cost fD of setting up 
production at home. After paying the fixed cost fD the firm produces 
a unique variety of a differentiated good for the home market at a 
marginal labor cost equal to its productivity draw a.  
The degree of participation in international markets that a 
firm chooses is governed by the following parameters: An additional 
fixed cost fX has to be incurred in order to export, while setting up a 
foreign production plant has a (higher) fixed cost of fI. The 
concentration force is embodied in the difference between these two 
parameters, whereas the proximity force stems from the fact that 
exporting adds to marginal cost by commanding iceberg-type 
transport costs of τ>1 per unit of output sold in the export market. 
That is to say, it is assumed that τ units of output have to be 
shipped in order for one unit to arrive at the foreign destination. 
                                                 
2 It should be clear that the HMY model adds nothing to the understanding of 
which specific firm will have productivity advantages vis-à-vis its competitors 
because the draws are random. The contribution of the model lies in explaining 
how heterogeneous productivity levels and trade patterns can coexist in equilibrium 
rather than explaining the productivity and trade pattern of a specific firm.    4   
Production by a foreign affiliate, on the other hand, does not incur 
per-unit transport costs and is produced using the same firm-specific 
level of efficiency a as in the home country.
3  
  From this distinction between fixed and marginal costs 
assumed in the model, it becomes clear that the sales volume in the 
foreign country will play a crucial role in determining the optimal 
degree of internationalization of a firm. Suppose for simplicity that 
wages are equal between the two countries. Consumers are assumed 
to have CES preferences over differentiated products with an 
elasticity of substitution 1/(1-α), and market structure is assumed to 
be monopolistic competition.
4 A firm’s variety in a given market will 
then be priced at p=a/α if produced in the same country, or at 





i is a measure of the market size of country i. 
Hence, regardless of how a firm decides to serve a market, its sales 
volume in that market will be a decreasing function of its marginal 
cost parameter a, or in other words a strictly increasing function of 
its productivity.  
Since firms charge markups above unity and thus enjoy 
positive operating profits, the volume of sales determines a firm’s 
ability to recoup the fixed costs associated with different choices. 
First, consider the decision to produce for the domestic market and 
incur fixed costs fD. Only firms above a certain productivity threshold 
can expect a sales volume large enough to recoup fD. Firms with a 
productivity below this threshold will hence decide not to enter the 
market. The marginal firm that decides to enter the domestic 
market, however, will find it unprofitable to serve a foreign market 
through exports: Since it faces higher marginal costs in that market 
due to transport costs, it will not be able to generate the sales 
volume necessary to recoup the additional fixed costs of exporting fX 
in the foreign market. By the same token, it will not be able to pay 
fI > fX. Going up in the productivity ordering of firms, however, there 
                                                 
3 This holds true if there are no factor cost differences between the home and the 
host country. Head and Ries (2003) show that these can alter and in the extreme 
case invert the predictions of the model. In other words, the concept of FDI 
underlying the HMY model is a horizontal one, in which FDI is motivated by 
market access. Given that the overwhelming majority of the firms in our sample 
invest in other OECD countries (see section 4), it seems reasonable to test this 
model on our data.  
4 Head and Ries (2003) show that CES preferences and iceberg costs are not 
necessary to derive the results of the model. They use a quadratic utility function.    5   
will eventually be a firm whose expected sales volume meets the 
threshold necessary to expect positive profits in the foreign market 
from exporting, but not from FDI. Going further up in the 
productivity ranking, there will be a threshold firm whose expected 
sales volume in the foreign market is high enough so that it would 
rather pay the higher fixed cost fI than the per-unit transport costs. 
This is the proximity-concentration tradeoff at the level of the firm, 
whose balance is determined by the sales volume of the firm in the 
foreign market, which in turn is a function of firm productivity.  
Summing up, the model predicts three well-defined cut-off 
productivity levels: One at which firms decide to set up production in 
the home market, a second one at which they will export in addition 
to their domestic sales, and a third one at which FDI begins to 
dominate exporting. These cut-offs imply that firms with a 
productivity level above the highest threshold will engage in FDI, 
while a set of firms with productivity levels strictly below the FDI 
firms will export but not set up foreign affiliates. Finally, the 
productivity of purely domestic firms lies strictly below that of the 
exporting firms.  
 
 
3 Related Empirical Literature 
 
The present paper investigates the productivity patterns of 
firms that fall into three categories: Domestic non-exporters (D), 
domestic exporters (DX) and multinational firms with outward 
investment in a foreign country (DI). The argument entails two 
partial elements, which have been the subject of prior empirical 
research.  
For one, an extensive empirical literature has investigated 
productivity patterns across exporting and non-exporting firms. 
Evidence is now available for a number of countries, including the 
United States (Bernard and Jensen 1999, 2004), the UK (Girma et al. 
2004), Germany (Arnold and Hussinger 2005, also Fryges 2004 for a 
comparison of young high-tech firms in the UK and Germany), 
Taiwan and Korea (Aw et al. 2000) and for developing countries such 
as Chile (Pavcnik 2002), Colombia, Mexico and Morrocco (Clerides, 
Lach and Tybout 1998). The general message coming from this 
evidence is that exporters tend to outperform non-exporting firms,   6   
and that the causality mostly runs from productivity to export 
status.  
Second, some studies investigate productivity differences 
between multinational companies and domestic companies both in 
the home and host countries. Doms and Jensen (1998) show that US 
multinationals have an above-average productivity with respect to all 
US companies. Yeaple (2005) shows that lagged productivity is a 
significant predictor of US firms establishing foreign subsidiaries, and 
Castellani and Barba Navaretti (2004) finds similar results for Italian 
companies. With respect to the host country, Arnold and Javorcik 
(2005) show that foreign ownership has a significant positive effect on 
plant performance in Indonesia. Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004) 
provide a survey of the literature.  
Apart from these studies lending partial support for the 
pattern suggested by theory, three studies undertake a more 
complete look at the issue. Head and Ries (2003) look at a sample of 
1070 publicly listed Japanese firms for which they have information 
on exports and outward FDI. The study compares average TFP 
across firms with different degrees of internationalization, and finds 
some support for the predicted ordering, although the differences 
tend to be statistically insignificant. Head and Ries also estimate an 
ordered linear probability model, and again find mixed results. While 
the association between TFP and degree of internationalization is 
often positive, it is in many instances not statistically significant and 
on occasions even negative.  
Girma, Görg and Strobl (2005) compare the productivity 
distributions of D, DX and DI firms in the Republic of Ireland, using 
data for the year 2000. Their study finds only partial support for the 
predictions from theory: They find no significant productivity 
differences between D and DX plants, while the productivity 
distribution function of DI firms statistically dominates the remaining 
two. However, their analysis is restricted to partial measures of firm 
productivity such as sales, value added and profit per employee. 
Lacking information on capital stocks of firms, they cannot control 
for possible underlying differences in capital intensity across the three 
groups of firms. Hence if firms with international engagement employ 
a more capital-intensive production technique, the findings run the 
risk of overestimating the performance of these firms.    7   
Girma, Kneller and Pisu (2005) compare the productivity 
distributions of firms with different trade orientations using UK data. 
While this study examines total factor productivity (TFP) rather 
than labor productivity, the trade-related information in the principal 
data set used includes only information on the export status and on 
ownership. They make an effort to complement this with information 
on foreign investment activities from other sources, but are not able 
to achieve full systematic coverage of all firms in their sample with 
respect to FDI. Moreover, the information on foreign subsidiaries 
they gather is available only for one year, and is then backcast. They 
complement this analysis by examining foreign multinationals in the 
UK (on which they have full information for the latest year) rather 
than UK multinationals as the third category. While this is a clear 
departure from the theoretical model, it is expected to deliver similar 
results in the special case of symmetric countries. Their results are 
consistent with the HMY model for most but not all of the years in 
their observed time frame.  
Finally, Wagner (2005) analyzes information from personal 
interviews on a sample of firms from the German state of Lower 
Saxony for the year 1995 and finds supportive evidence for the HMY 
model using value added per worker.  
Our paper represents an improvement on existing studies in 
several regards: For one, our data have a panel structure covering the 
years 1996 to 2002, and they are not restricted to publicly listed 
firms. We use a stratified sample including also small and medium 
enterprises, some of which tend to be heavily engaged in international 
activities in the German case. Second, our productivity measure is 
total factor productivity and not a partial productivity measure. 
Third, in contrast to other studies our productivity estimations 
control for a possible simultaneity bias in input choice by using a 
semi-parametric estimator suggested by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). 
Fourth, we use reliable information on the foreign activities of 
German firms, which is collected by the German central bank on a 
mandatory basis. Using this information, we undertake comparisons 
of the entire TFP distributions of samples by testing for stochastic 
dominance, for each of the 7 years between  1996 and 2002.  
 
   8   
4 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
The data used in the present study come from two main 
sources, which have been merged for the first time. We use a rich 
array of firm-level information from a stratified, representative survey 
of the German manufacturing sector called the Mannheim Innovation 
Panel (MIP). The MIP is a yearly survey conducted by the Centre or 
European Economic Research (ZEW) on behalf of the German 
Federal Ministry for Education and Research (BMBF). With its 
principal focus on firms’ innovation behavior, the MIP is the German 
part of the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) of the European 
Commission, which is conducted every fourth year. Started in 1992, 
the survey collects yearly information from manufacturing firms all 
over the country. The MIP contains information on firm-level output 
and export activities of each firm, in addition to several classes of 
production inputs.
5   
Our second data source complements this information with 
complete records on foreign subsidiaries of the firms in our sample. 
For this study, it was possible to merge firm records from the MIP 
with the micro-data base MiDi (Micro Database Direct Investment) 
provided by the German central bank (Bundesbank), which contains 
a complete listing of German direct investment stocks abroad.
6 Legal 
reporting requirements of the Foreign Trade and Payments 
Regulation (“Aussenwirtschaftsverordnung”) guarantee the 
completeness of this information, for firms whose balance sheet total 
exceed the effective exemption limits. In the case of minority 
participations these amount to € 5 million. For majority 
participations, branches and permanent establishments, any 
engagement exceeding a balance sheet total of € 500 thousand is 
subject to mandatory reporting to the Bundesbank. Indirect 
participating interests have to be reported if a primary direct 
investment branch has a holding of at least 10% in another firm or if 
the investing firm has participating interests larger than 50% of the 
                                                 
5 A detailed description of the Mannheim Innovation Panel can be found in Janz et 
al. (2001). Note that this data set has been previously exploited in Arnold and 
Hussinger (2005) to test the causal relationship between firm productivity and 
export behavior. The findings of that study confirm the partial assessment that 
German exporters outperform non-exporting firms.  
6 See Lipponer (2003a) for a detailed description of this data base.    9   
capital shares or voting rights of the corresponding primary branch.
7 
In our analysis, we consider any firm that reported either direct or 
indirectly held assets abroad as a multinational firm (DI type). 
The merge process, for which sufficient identification 
information was available from 1996 on, was conducted using a 
computer-supported text field search algorithm, where matches are 
assigned according to firm names and addresses. Every potential 
match found by the search program was checked manually. The data 
set thus obtained is an unbalanced panel of 6,234 firm-level 
observations between 1996 and 2002, which corresponds to 2,148 
firms. On average, there are 2.90 years of data per firm available. 
The data contain firms from all over Germany, including the former 
Eastern part of the country.  
All three types of firms are present in each of the industries. 
With regard to international commercial relations, the largest subset 
of firms are exporting firms with no foreign investment (DX type). 
4,092 observations belong to this group, among which are 1,499 firms 
with exports in each year. 660 observations belong to the DI type, 
which corresponds to 248 firms. 103 of those firms invest abroad in 
every sample year. We also observe the number of FDI projects a 
firm is engaged in for a given year. The mean of this number is 
approximately 6, while the median is only 2, implying a right-skewed 
distribution of the number of projects per firm. Most of the firms of 
type DI have at least one investment in the EU (72%) and in OECD 
countries (87%), which hints at a significant relevance of horizontal, 
market-seeking motivations for German outward FDI.  
An interesting fact that emerged from the data was the 
absence of non-exporting firms with foreign assets in our sample, 
eliminating the need for a further distinction of firm types. All of the 
firms of the DI type had at least some exports, although we are not 
able to determine what proportion of these went to the foreign 
affiliate. The remainder of the sample consists of non-exporting firms 
with no foreign investment (D type), and comprises 1,482 
observations.  
                                                 
7 Note that the reporting exemption limits changed in 1996 and in 2002, which 
influenced the number of records available (see Lipponer, 2003a, 2003b). Given 
that our analysis is done separately for each year, and covers the time period 1996-
2002, our results are unlikely to be affected by this.    10    
  Table 1 shows separate descriptive statistics for firms of the 
D, DX and DI type. On average, exporters are larger than non-
exporters, both in terms of employment and sales or value added. 
Firms with foreign investment tend to be the largest of the three 
subsets. Interestingly, this ordering also carries over to the propensity 
to engage in R&D activities (the variable "Innovator"), and to the 
amount of investment into such activities. DX and DI firms also tend 
to pay higher wages to their employees, as measured by the total 
wage bill relative to the number of employees. Finally, Table 1 also 
presents information on firm location, with the most interesting 
distinction for the case of Germany being the East-West divide. East 
Germany was a centrally planned economy up to 1989 and has been 
undergoing a transition process into a market economy since then. As 
several studies suggest, the process of catching-up of East German 
firms still is not yet completed (see Czarnitzki, 2005, as an example). 
In this light, it may seem of little surprise that in our (stratified) 
sample, the proportion of East German firms is highest in the 
subgroup of firms that serve only the domestic market, and decreases 
with increasing degree of internationalization.
8  







 N=1,482  N=4,092  N=660 
Number of employees  74  440  3,223 
Sales 9.67  76.63  688.10 
Value Added  5.40  40.73  308.10 
Innovator (yes/no)  16%  40%  55% 
R&D expenditure (if innovator)  .23  2.37  38.03 
Share of sales from new products 5%  7%  5% 
Total wage bill  4.86  39.22  293.51 
Wage per employee  .06  .07  .08 
Materials 4.28  35.90  380.00 
East Germany  48%  29%  7% 
Export turnover  -  37.07  323.61 
Export intensity  -  .28  .42 
FDI turnover  -  -  420.31 
FDI intensity  -  -  .86 
Number of FDI projects   -  -  5.99 
At least 1 FDI project in EU   -  -  72% 
At least 1 FDI project in OECD  -  -  87% 
All monetary variables are measured in € millions. 
                                                 
8 In order to avoid the possibility of picking up East-West differences rather than 
differences in international commerce, we will repeat all the subsequent exercises 
excluding firms from East Germany. This never affected our results significantly.    11    
5 Empirical Strategy 
 
The aim of this paper is to undertake performance 
comparisons across subsets of firms, defined by their degree of foreign 
engagement, with our measure of firm performance being total factor 
productivity (TFP). As a first step, we estimate TFP in the standard 
way, as the residual of a two-factor Cobb-Douglas production 
function. The value added of the firm is estimated as a function of 
labor and capital inputs. All nominal values are deflated using a set 
of sector-specific deflators from the German Federal Statistical Office. 
Our production function is estimated separately for each 3-digit 
sector of the Nace Rev. 1.1.
9  
A number of caveats apply when estimating firm-level 
productivity. First, partial productivity measures such as labor 
productivity are biased if there are systematic differences in capital 
intensity across the subsets of firms to be analyzed. This is a 
possibility that we cannot rule out in our specific case, which is why 
we abstain from using partial productivity measures. A second 
challenge arises due to the fact that firms can observe shocks to their 
own productivity about which the researcher does not know, and 
make their factor input choices contingent on these shocks. Such a 
behavioral pattern would cause the orthogonality of our explanatory 
variables and the error term (our TFP estimate) in our data to be 
violated, and thus render OLS estimation techniques invalid. This 
well-known problem is usually referred to as the simultaneity bias 
(Marschak and Andrews, 1944). We address this issue by using a 
semi-parametric estimator, in which a proxy variable is used to 
account for unobserved productivity shocks.  
The literature makes several suggestions for the choice of 
proxy: Olley and Pakes (1996) suggest the use of firm investment, 
while Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) propose material inputs of the 
firm instead. Our choice fell on the latter procedure, for several 
reasons. For one, not all firms have strictly positive investment in all 
periods, but only those observations may be retained in order for the 
procedure to be valid. In our case, this would imply a significant loss 
of observations. Material inputs, on the other hand, are strictly 
                                                 
9 Some sectors had to be grouped together to achieve a sufficiently large number of 
observations for every estimation. Details on our industry aggregation can be found 
in the appendix.    12    
positive in all cases. Second, material inputs are less likely to be 
subject to indivisibilities and we would hence expect them to follow 
more closely any unobserved changes in firm productivity. We 
estimate production functions at the 3-digit level employing the 
Levinsohn and Petrin procedure, and use the residuals from these 
estimations as our estimates for firm-level TFP. In order to compare 
TFP estimates resulting from different sector-wise estimations, and 
to focus our attention on firm heterogeneity within sectors, we divide 
our TFP measure by the average TFP in the respective industry and 
year, and refer to the measure thus obtained as relative 
productivity.
10  
  In order to undertake these kinds of comparisons, we invoke 
the concept of first order stochastic dominance.
11 Suppose we have 
two independent random samples of productivity realizations. One 
sample ω1, …,ωn is drawn from a distribution function Ω1 and the 
other sample, ωn+1,…, ωN is drawn from another distribution function 
Ω2. The hypothesis of interest is that Ω1(ω)-Ω2(ω)≤0 ∀ ω∈ℜ. If this 
hypothesis holds, and the inequality is strict for at least some ω∈ℜ, 
we say that Ω1 dominates Ω2 stochastically. More intuitively, this is 
to say that the cumulative distribution function of a variable in the 
first random sample lies entirely to the right the corresponding 
cumulative distribution function in the other random sample.  
Girma et al. (2005) consider an interesting extension of the 
HMY model. They note that if one relaxes the assumption of 
deterministic and fixed productivity levels and assumes each period’s 
productivity realization to be subject to a random shock, regions of 
uncertainty may arise around the threshold productivity levels. In 
these regions, firms with similar productivity levels may make 
different choices, creating some overlap between the productivities of 
firms from different categories that is not present in the original 
model. As long as the self-selection mechanism remains an essential 
determinant of a firm’s participation in international markets, 
stochastic dominance would continue to hold in such a setting. The 
concept thus remains a valid means of examining the rank ordering 
                                                 
10 Hence an average-performing firm will have a relative TFP of exactly one. 
11 Although the concept of stochastic dominance dates from the 1930s, its first 
application in the context of international economics can be found in Delgado et al. 
(2002).    13    
predicted by the model, even in the presence of some degree of 
uncertainty.  
  Stochastic dominance can be tested by evaluating two related 
null hypotheses. The first step is to reject the equality of 
distributions as in the null hypothesis 
 
HO:  Ω1(ω)-Ω2(ω) = 0   ∀ ω∈ℜ.  
 
This is the two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, for which the 
asymptotic distribution of the test statistic has been derived by 
Kolmogorov (1933) and Smirnov (1939) under the assumption of 
independently drawn samples. If equality of the distributions over 
samples can be rejected, and at the same time one cannot reject the 
corresponding one-sided test that  
 
HO
’:  Ω1(ω)-Ω2(ω) ≤ 0   ∀ ω∈ℜ.  
 
then one can conclude that Ω1(ω) stochastically dominates Ω2(ω). 
The asymptotic distribution of the corresponding test statistic is also 
known for the one-sided test under the condition that both samples 
are independent. Since we are using panel data which include 
repeated observations of the same firms, the independence 
assumption is likely to be violated if we pool observations from 
several years. For that reason, we run the KS-tests separately for 





The two- and one-sided KS-tests allow us to formalize two 
kinds of comparisons between subsets of firms. First, we compare the 
productivity outcomes between D and DX firms. As a second step, 
we compare DX and DI firms. If in both cases, the two-sided test is 
rejected while the one-sided test is not, then we can establish a clear 
ranking of the three samples by transitivity, and conclude that the 
productivity distribution of DX firms dominates D firms, while the 
distribution DI dominates both DX and D firms.  
The results from the two- and one-sided KS-tests are displayed 
in Table 2. Column 4 of Table 2 presents the results of the two-sided   14    
tests for the equality of the distribution between D and DX firms. 
This null hypothesis can be easily rejected for all years. The one-
sided test statistic in column 5, on the other hand, is not significant 
at conventional levels, meaning that we cannot reject HO’. This is to 
say that we cannot reject the null that exporters are the higher 
productivity group. In other words, DX firms outperform D firms 
over the entire productivity distribution. The same kind of results for 
the comparison between DI and DX firms are displayed in the two 
rightmost columns of Table 3. Again, we can conclude stochastic 
dominance of the group of firms with the stronger foreign 
engagement.   
 
 
Table 2. Distributions of Productivity Levels.  
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for Non-Exporters (D) vs Exporters (DX). 




One-sided KS test 
statistic (Ho’) 
DX larger group 




























Asymptotic p-values in parentheses.  
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Table 3. Distributions of Productivity Levels.  
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for Exporters (DX) vs Multinationals (DI). 
Year 
No. of D firms  No. of DX firms




One-sided KS test 
statistic (Ho’) 
DI larger group 




























Asymptotic p-values in parentheses.  
 
 
These results confirm the productivity ranking of firms 
postulated by theory. As predicted by the HMY model, exporting 
firms are better performers than firms that produce for the domestic 
market only, while firms with foreign subsidiaries are the most 
productive of the three groups. The patterns present in our dataset of 
German manufacturing firms are thus consistent with the self-
selection hypothesis underlying the HMY model.  
Figure 1 gives an illustration of the intuitive meaning of these 
test. It depicts the cumulative distribution functions (CDF) of TFP 
for the three subsamples D firms (domestic sales only), DX firms 
(exporters) and DI firms (firms with investment abroad). The 
productivity ordering suggested by theory becomes apparent in this 
graph: The CDF of DI firms lies entirely to the right of that of DX 
firms, whose CDF in turn lies entirely to the right of the one 
corresponding to firms of the D type. The difference between DI 
firms and DX firms is slightly larger than the one between DX and D 
firms.  
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-4 -2 0 2  
       Log relative TFP 
––  D firms ----- DX firms  ····· DI firms 
 
 
Given the particular case of Germany with its different recent 
economic history between the western and the eastern part of the 
country, we want to make sure that our analysis is not influenced by 
differences between East and West. In particular, one might 
conjecture that East German firms suffer from a productivity 
disadvantage vis-à-vis their western counterparts, while at the same 
time being less involved in international markets. For this reason, we 
repeated the analysis after dropping all East German firms from our 
sample. All our previous results are qualitatively the same when 






In this paper, we have used a representative sample of German 
manufacturing firms to test a prediction of a recent theoretical paper 
in the theory of international trade with heterogeneous firms. 
Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) predict that it is the more 
productive firms that can afford to pay the fixed costs of serving 
                                                 
12 In fact, these results are so similar to the main results presented in tables 3 and 4 
that we refrained from presenting them here. They are available from the authors 
upon request.    17    
foreign customers via exports. Moreover, only the top performing 
firms find it profitable to pay a further fixed cost of setting up 
foreign establishments to be closer to their foreign customers.  
  To analyze this proposed pattern empirically, we estimate firm 
total productivity for 43 German manufacturing sectors using a semi-
parametric estimator following Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) to 
control for a possible simultaneity bias of input choice. We then use a 
non-parametric testing technique to rank the distribution of total 
factor productivity across the three subsets of firms, as defined by 
their engagement in international markets. Rather than just 
comparing first moments, these Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests allow us 
to make statements about the entire distribution of productivity 
across groups, using the concept of stochastic dominance.  
  Our data display a significant amount of within-sector firm 
heterogeneity with respect to productivity. The predicted threefold 
ordering of firm productivity according to the firms’ trade orientation 
is compatible with our German data. We show that German 
exporters outperform firms that serve only the domestic market over 
the entire productivity distribution. In a similar manner, German 
multinational firms, defined as firms with subsidiaries abroad, are 
more productive than both domestically focused and exporting firms 
in Germany. These findings hold true for each year from 1996 to 
2002. Our results thus lend strong empirical support for one of the 
key predictions of the theoretical approach of Helpman, Melitz and 
Yeaple (2004) for the case of German manufacturing.  
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Appendix 
Table 4: The industry grouping used in our TFP estimations. 
Industry     NACE 3 
Food Products and Beverages 151-159 
Other Food Products  158 
Beverages, Tobacco Products 159-160,  171, 
175, 180, 200, 
211, 212 
Preparation and Spinning of Textile Fibres, Textile Weaving, 
Finishing of Textiles, Manufacture of Made-up Textile Articles, 
except Apparel 
171-174 
Other Textiles, Knitted and Crocheted Fabrics and Articles 175-177 
Wearing Apparel; Dressing and Dyeing of Fur, Leather and Leather 
Products 
180-193 
Wood and Wood Products 201-205 
Pulp, Paper and Paper Products 211 
Articles of Paper and Paperboard, Reproduction of Recorded Media 212 
Pulp, Paper and Paper Products, Publishing and Printing 221-223 
Coke, Refined Petroleum Products and Nuclear Fuel 231-233 
Basic Chemicals, Pesticides and Other Agro-chemical Products, 
Paints, Varnishes and Similar Coatings, Printing Ink and Mastics 
241-243 
Pharmaceuticals, Medicinal Chemicals and Botanical Products, 
Soap and Detergents, Cleaning and Polishing Preparations, 
Perfumes and Toilet Preparations, Other Chemical Products, 
Man-made Fibres 
244-247 
Rubber Products 251 
Plastic Products 252 
Glass and Glass Products 261 
Non-refractory Ceramic Goods Other than for Construction 
Purposes; Refractory Ceramic Products, Ceramic Tiles and Flags, 
Bricks, Tiles and Construction Products, in Baked Clay 
262-264 
Cement, Lime and Plaster, Articles of Concrete, Plaster and 
Cement 
265-266 
Cutting, Shaping and Finishing of Ornamental and Building Stone, 
other Non-metallic Mineral Products 
267-268 
Basic Iron and Steel and of Ferro-alloys, Tubes, Other First 
Processing of Iron and Steel 
271-273 
Basic Precious and Non-ferrous Metals, Casting of Metals 274-275 
Structural Metal Products 281 
Tanks, Reservoirs and Containers of Metal; Manufacture of Central 
Heating Radiators and Boilers, Steam Generators, except Central 
Heating Hot Water Boilers, Forging, Pressing, Stamping and Roll 
Forming of Metal; Powder Metallurgy 
282-284 
Treatment and Coating of Metals; General Mechanical Engineering 285 
Cutlery, Tools and General Hardware 286 
Other Fabricated Metal Products 287 
Machinery for the Production and use of Mechanical Power, except 
Aircraft, Vehicle and Cycle Engines 
290-291 
Other General Purpose Machinery, Weapons and Ammunition, 292, 296-297   22    
Dom. Appliances nec. 
Agricultural and Forestry Machinery, Machinetools 293-294 
Other Special Purpose Machinery 295 
Office Machinery and Computers, Electric Motors, Generators and 
Transformers 
300, 311 
Electricity Distribution and Control Apparatus, Insulated Wire and 
Cable, Accumulators, Primary Cells and Primary Batteries 
312-314 
Lighting Equipment and Electric Lamps 315 
Electrical Equipment n.e.c. 316 
Radio, Television and Communication Equipment and Apparatus 321-323 
Medical and Surgical Equipment and Orthopaedic Appliances 331 
Instruments and Appliances for Measuring, Checking, Testing, 
Navigating and Other Purposes, except Industrial Process Control 
Equipment 
332 
Industrial Process Control Equipment, Optical Instruments and 
Photographic Equipment, Watches and Clocks 
333-335 
Motor Vehicles, Bodies (Coachwork) for Motor Vehicles; Trailers 
and Semi-trailers 
341-342 
Parts and Accessories for Motor Vehicles and their Engines 343 
Other Transport Equipment 351-355 
Furniture, Jewellery and Related Articles 361-362 
Games and Toys, Miscellaneous Manufacturing n.e.c. 365-366 
 